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The year 2014 contains two anniversaries of great significance in the history of democracy. Global attention will no doubt focus primarily on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Revolutions of 1989, and deservedly so. But there is also another important anniversary for students of democracy to celebrate and to reflect upon this year—the fortieth anniversary of the launching of the Portuguese Revolution in 1974. Thanks to Samuel P. Huntington's classic study *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, which opens with an account of the military revolt of 25 April 1974, the Portuguese Revolution has come to be acknowledged as the starting point of the cascade of transitions that Huntington dubbed democracy's "third wave."[1]

In his book, which was completed in 1990 and published in 1991, Huntington estimated that since the Portuguese Revolution the world had witnessed "the transition of some thirty countries from nondemocratic to democratic political systems," and he called this "perhaps the most important global political development of the late twentieth century."[2] As we now can see in hindsight, however, the pace of democratic change actually was accelerating even as Huntington's book went to press. By 1995, some forty additional countries had been added to the ranks of electoral democracies, which became the world's prevalent form of regime, encompassing more than 60 percent of all countries. Moreover, insofar as the global democratic resurgence was instrumental in bringing about the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, and thus the end of the Cold War, the case for its being the most important global

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political development of the last quarter of the twentieth century is difficult to challenge.

Of course, the frequency of democratic transitions has dramatically slowed in the new century. But before discussing the current state and future prospects of democracy, I want to step back for a moment and try to place the recent wave of transitions to democracy in a broader theoretical and historical context. The best term to describe the wider class of phenomena to which democratic transitions belong is "regime change." Unfortunately, this term has become colored by its popular association with the U.S. invasion of Iraq, but I will use it anyway, while emphasizing that it is not meant to refer primarily to political change achieved by external military force (though of course military action can sometimes be the cause of regime change). After all, regime change is a literal translation of an ancient Greek term (*metabolē politeias*) used by Aristotle, the founder of empirical political science.[3] This expression is sometimes translated into English with the word "revolution"—another term that I will have something to say about.

In Book V of the *Politics,* Aristotle discusses the causes of regime change, how the various types of regimes come to break down, and the ways in which they may best be preserved. At the same time, he emphasizes that while political uprisings sometimes seek to change the nature of the regime, in other cases they simply aim to replace the rulers who are in control of the existing regime. This is an important point to keep in mind when thinking about political change. Changes in government do not necessarily amount to changes in regime. This is true not only of electoral changes in democracies and of dynastic succession in monarchies, but also of some changes achieved through violence, such as coups d'état that replace one military ruler or dictator with another.

For Aristotle, the different kinds of regimes reflect the various contending forces in political life and their competing claims to justice. Above all, there is a permanent tension between rich and poor, often leading to movement back and forth between oligarchy and democracy. Aristotle's account does provide advice about institutional design for those who are trying to make existing regimes more stable, but he neither gives any indication that he expects such solutions to be permanent in their effects nor suggests that regime change tends to move in one particular direction. Instead, he seems to envision an ongoing cycle of regime change between one type and another.

Here I can offer no more than the briefest of comments on regime change, in both theory and practice, in the early modern era. The first thing to note is that modern Europe soon came to be dominated by a new form of regime, the large-scale national monarchy. It was against this form of regime that the great revolutions of the modern era later were directed. Britain's Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the American Revolution are justly associated with the thought of John Locke, and the

French Revolution with the thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. There was clearly a sense in which both philosophers endorsed a "right to revolution," although neither used the phrase. In any case, they did not give a central place in their thought to the different kinds of regimes, nor did they focus in the manner of Aristotle on changes from one form of regime to another. Instead, their teachings emphasized the natural equality of all human beings and the consequent lack of legitimacy of regimes that are not derived from the consent of the people.

Tocqueville and the Great Democratic Revolution

The modern European thinker I want to focus on today is Alexis de Tocqueville, not just because this lecture series bears his name, but because of the importance of his insights on revolution and regime change. The famous opening chapter of *Democracy in America* offers a meditation on what Tocqueville labels "a great democratic revolution," the continuing progress toward greater equality of conditions that he calls "the most permanent fact known in history."[4] It has been gathering force within the Christian countries of Europe since the eleventh century, and has annihilated feudalism and vanquished kings. It is unstoppable and irreversible, and thus may be regarded as a "providential fact." The durability of this revolution can be taken as a sign that it represents God's will, just as it can be known "without the creator's raising his voice that the stars follow the arcs in space that his finger has traced."

But what is the nature of this great democratic revolution that Tocqueville describes? In the first place, it is what he calls a "social revolution," a change in the social conditions under which men live. It is not an abrupt shift, but proceeds in a gradual and progressive fashion. Though it usually advances slowly, there is no question about where it is heading, and that is in one direction only. The word revolution in English and other modern European languages has a curious double sense. When applied to the natural world it describes a cycle that endlessly repeats itself, as with the revolution of the heavenly bodies. But when applied to the human world, it usually means a major and often abrupt shift that produces something new. This is surely the sense it has when we speak of the American, French, or Russian revolutions.

Tocqueville's "great democratic revolution" is surely not cyclical, but neither is it a sudden change rather than one that advances sporadically. That is linked to the fact that it is primarily a social revolution and only secondarily a political one. Yet its political consequences are enormous. As a result of the "great democratic revolution," all regimes formally based on inequality are in the process of losing their legitimacy and thus their ability to maintain themselves. When Tocqueville speaks of the waning of aristocracy, he gives this term a very broad signification. Virtually all regimes preceding the founding of the United States

were, in his view, aristocratic. The citizens of Athens may have enjoyed universal suffrage, but they were greatly outnumbered by the slave population. Thus Tocqueville asserts that Athens was "only an aristocratic republic in which all the nobles had an equal right to the government."[5] The post-aristocratic condition emerging in modern times is something truly unprecedented. It is a "new society" and even a "new world." Aristocratic nations are so different from the "new peoples" of the democratic age that they are "two distinct humanities."[6]

But while the inevitable advance of social equality renders the resurrection of some kinds of regimes impossible, it does not predetermine a crucial aspect of the political dispensation that will prevail in democratic times. For it is essential to underline that, when Tocqueville speaks of the "great democratic revolution," he is referring to the march of *social equality* and not of *political freedom*. Social equality is fated to triumph, whether we like it or not. But under these equal social conditions there still remains an important arena of political choice. As Tocqueville states it most dramatically in the concluding lines of *Democracy in America:* "Nations of our day cannot have it that conditions within them are not equal; but it depends upon them whether equality leads them to servitude or freedom, to enlightenment or barbarism, to prosperity or misery."[7]

Tocqueville's analysis of the course of modern history was remarkably prescient, and I would say that it still remains essentially valid today. The contemporary political landscape differs from that of past ages above all in the almost total absence of aristocratic or formally oligarchic regimes. Institutions that formally represent the interests of the rich, the well-born, or the upper classes, as Britain's House of Lords long did, have virtually disappeared. There do remain a handful of monarchies, mostly in the Arab world, where the king exercises real political power, but today they are outliers. We tend to forget how recently it was that monarchy was still the world's modal form of government. As late as 1910, when the Portuguese brought down their monarchy and established the country's first republic, the only other republics outside the Americas were France, Switzerland, Liberia, and San Marino.

But of course the demise of aristocracy and decline of monarchy did not everywhere lead to the establishment of free regimes. As the experience of the French Revolution and its aftermath had already demonstrated, toppling the traditional pillars of inequality did not reliably pave the way for regimes that protected individual freedom. And the twentieth century would witness the creation of totalitarian regimes that brought greater servitude than had any of their monarchical predecessors.

When we use the word democracy today, we mean a regime that combines individual freedom and the rule of law with equality among its citizens. If only a limited portion of the population is granted equal rights—as was the case, for example, in South Africa under apartheid—no one would call such a regime a democracy. By the same token, even

the most egalitarian society, if it routinely violates individual freedoms and the rule of law, would not be called democratic. But since the demise of apartheid, there are no longer any regimes in the world that preserve individual freedoms for a significant fraction of their population while oppressing the rest. Yet there still are many that offer formal equality without freedom.

Democratization and the Political Scientists

Bearing this distinction in mind, let us return our attention to Huntington's three waves of democratization.[8] The first "long wave," as he calls it, lasted from 1828 to 1926: The starting date of 1828 is when it is estimated that the suffrage in the United States reached 50 percent of all adult males. (If one adhered to today's standards, of course, no country that lacked female suffrage, let alone tolerated slavery, could have been designated as democratic.) But this long wave really comprises two groupings. The first are the dozen or so European and European-settler countries that already had succeeded in establishing a fair degree of freedom and rule of law, and then moved into the democratic column by gradually extending the suffrage. The second grouping includes countries that became democratic after World War I, many of them new nations born from the midst of the European empires defeated and destroyed during the war.

After a "reverse wave" that brought down democracy in most of the countries where it had been established after the First World War, a second, short wave (1943–62) began with the triumph of the Allies in the Second World War. Apart from some Latin American cases, the "second-wave" democracies were either countries defeated in World War II, including Germany, Japan, and Italy, or new nations produced by decolonization, such as India, Jamaica, and Israel. There then followed, according to Huntington's account, a second reverse wave, during which many of the newly decolonized nations and a number of Latin American countries saw their democracies break down. By the mid-1970s democracy was at a low point in the developing world. Two of Latin America's most successful democracies, Uruguay and Chile, had fallen to military coups in 1973, and in 1975 Indira Gandhi proclaimed a state of emergency in India, suspending elections and civil liberties.

When the Portuguese Revolution was launched in 1974, there was great uncertainty about whether it would issue in the establishment of democracy, and no one dreamed that it would initiate a new global wave of democratization. In fact, during the 1970s political scientists were focusing on the processes that led to the *demise* of democracies: A long and complex multi-author project that began in 1970 culminated with the publication in 1978 of *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*, a four-volume study edited by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan that focused on the interwar cases in Europe and the more recent ones in Latin America. The

goal of this study was not only to improve scholarly understanding, but also to explore whether prodemocratic forces might have pursued other options that would have more effectively preserved democracy. In the preface to that work, the editors conclude with a call for future research on "closely related issues," including "the process of *transition* (italics mine) from authoritarian to democratic regimes."[9]

This may be the appropriate point at which to consider the career of the term "transition," which now has become ubiquitous in the discourse of political scientists and public officials alike. Though the word is employed to describe change in a whole variety of different contexts, its use to refer to a change in political regime is relatively new. In fact, this meaning is not even mentioned in the *Oxford English Dictionary*'s entry for the word.

A key role in introducing the term in this sense was played by a much-cited article by political scientist Dankwart Rustow entitled "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," published in 1970.[10] Rustow argues that most political scientists focus on how democracy can be preserved and strengthened in countries where it already exists. But, he adds, this is of little help to scholars of developing countries, who are more interested in "the genetic question of how a democracy comes into being in the first place." Writing well before the beginning of the third wave, Rustow speaks of transitions in a very general sense to describe the "advent" or coming into being, in whatever manner, of democracy. The primary example that he analyzes in his essay is the emergence in 1907 of democracy in Sweden—then a constitutional monarchy with limited suffrage—through a political agreement to adopt universal suffrage along with proportional representation. Rustow suggests that the primary protagonists in the struggle to initiate democracy are "social classes," and he states that the "minimum period of transition" is probably one generation. In short, he seems to have in mind a transition to democracy from oligarchy—not from authoritarianism—one that proceeds gradually as the pre–World War I transitions of the first wave had done.

The most influential study of the nature of transitions remains the four-volume work *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, edited by Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead and published in 1986.[11] By that time, the third-wave transitions to democracy in southern Europe and many of those in Latin America had already occurred. Although O'Donnell and Schmitter cite Rustow's "seminal article" as a source of inspiration, they make clear at the very outset of the fourth volume that the phenomenon they are addressing is the rapid replacement of *authoritarian* regimes (though they acknowledge that in some cases this may lead not to the introduction of democracy but to some new form of authoritarian rule). They define "transition" broadly as "the interval between one political regime and another." Yet it is clear that they emphasize a particular path to democratic transition—one that is neither violent nor revolutionary, but proceeds through negotiation between an outgoing

authoritarian regime and its democratic opposition and often relies upon formal or informal pacts that provide security guarantees to both sides.

The template of transition elaborated by O'Donnell and Schmitter on the basis of the southern European and Latin American transitions came to be applied to other regions as well, though not without debate among scholars about how well it "traveled," particularly to the postcommunist cases. It also came to be applied in a rather crude way by governments and by some democracy-assistance agencies, with every country where an authoritarian ruler had once been ousted being described as "in transition," no matter how weak its claim to be moving toward democracy. It was in part this flagrant abuse of the term that prompted Thomas Carothers to call for "the end of the transition paradigm" in an article bearing that title published in the *Journal of Democracy* in 2002. Carothers contended that there is no linear sequence of stages—from "breakthrough" to democratic "consolidation"—that all countries go through following the fall of an authoritarian regime. Instead, he argued, many countries said to be engaged in a democratic transition were in fact stuck in a "gray zone" from which there was no certainty that they would soon—or indeed, ever—emerge as liberal democracies.[12]

One need not look far today to find the widespread use and misuse of the term transition. A recent appropriations bill approved by the U.S. Congress makes available almost a billion dollars in aid to Egypt on the condition that its government "is taking steps to support a democratic transition"—something Egypt is clearly not doing. The term has now spread to international diplomacy as well, where its meaning becomes even more blurry. The "Final Communiqué" of the initial Geneva conference on Syria in June 2012 has a whole section, entitled "Clear Steps in the Transition," which is anything but clear. It does include a call for a popular referendum on a new constitution, to be followed by free and fair multiparty elections. But unless civil war can be considered a form of transition, this seems to be either pious hope or empty verbiage.

From Revolution to Transition

Despite the sometimes absurd stretching of the concept of transition, however, it is hard to address the issue of regime change without using it. As noted earlier, the other term still often used to describe regime change is "revolution." This tends to be the favored word of those who have risked their lives or livelihoods in overthrowing an autocratic regime. Thus many of the protagonists of the successful North African uprisings of the last few years still speak reverently of "the Revolution." The more violence and suffering that were inflicted upon eventually victorious opposition forces, the stronger seems to be their attachment to the ideal of revolution. And it cannot be denied that the term revolution has more glamor than the term transition. One can attach all kinds of colorful and appealing adjectives

to revolution—orange, rose, cedar, jasmine, and the like. But it somehow would sound foolish to talk of the orange or jasmine transition.

Yet I think one reason why the term transition has come into vogue is that the idea of revolution has become at least partly discredited in our time. The bitter experience of the totalitarian revolutions of the twentieth century has taught us some hard lessons. In particular, it revealed that the political imposition of the kind of egalitarian revolution that Tocqueville discussed—great social revolutions like the French and the Russian—may produce outcomes that suppress rather than foster freedom and democracy. The O'Donnell and Schmitter volumes on transitions make it clear that, while some of their contributors might favor a "second transition" to some form of socialism, they recognize that attempting to pursue socialism by revolutionary means (what they call the *vía revolucionaria*) is likely to involve the use of violence and drastically to reduce the prospects of achieving political democracy.[13] This understanding—a preference for avoiding violence and seeking a peaceful path to democracy through negotiations—is what gives the concept of democratic transitions a specific character and makes it more than just a general term for regime change. And indeed, a remarkable number of relatively peaceful shifts from authoritarian rule to aspiring democracies took place during the concluding decades of the twentieth century along the path charted by O'Donnell and Schmitter.

Why the Third Wave Was Different

Let us pause for a moment to consider how strikingly this third wave of democratization differed from its predecessors. The "first-wave" cases that preceded World War I consisted largely of the gradual emergence of democracy from oligarchy via the extension of the franchise, and they occurred principally due to internal causes. The post–World War I first-wave cases and the second wave, by contrast, were principally due to external causes: They had their origins in the geopolitical upheavals that characterized the two World Wars and the struggles for decolonization during the middle decades of the twentieth century. Most of these cases consisted either of countries that were defeated in war or of new nations formed from the breakdown of imperial or colonial rule.

To be sure, the third wave also included some cases that could be traced to decolonization and imperial breakdown and a few others precipitated by military defeat, as in Greece and Argentina. But on the whole, the profile of the third-wave transitions is quite different. They tended to be relatively quick—again with a few exceptions, most notably Taiwan and Mexico—yet these changes of regime were due largely to internal rather than external causes. What is more, they were generally characterized not by an extension of the franchise within an existing political order or the birth of a new nation, but rather by the collapse

of an authoritarian regime, often in the face of a popular mobilization demanding democracy and freedom.

Why the third wave began when it did in the mid-1970s remains a mystery. It is easier to explain, by referring to geopolitical factors, the increasing pace of democratization after 1980 and its further acceleration in the late 1980s and 1990s. The mid-1970s, however, seemed to be a period of weakness on the part of the Western democracies and of surging Soviet strength. Even during the 1980s, when the United States began to display renewed economic and political vigor and a greater commitment to promoting democracy abroad, hardly any democratic transitions were achieved through military means (Grenada and Panama are the exceptions).

A key reason for the resurgence of democracy undoubtedly lay in the increasingly manifest failings of its autocratic rivals. Gorbachev's futile attempt to reform the communist system led to the discrediting of communist ideology and culminated in the total collapse of the Soviet Union. Obviously, the elimination of the leading nondemocratic power in what had been a bipolar world opened the field for further democratic advances, but again, few of these were secured through force of arms. The key factor was that democracy came to be widely regarded as exceeding other regimes not only in legitimacy but also in attractiveness. As Georgian political scientist Ghia Nodia put it in 1996, "The greatest victory of democracy in the modern world is that . . . it has become fashionable. To live under autocracy, or even to *be* an autocrat, seems backward, uncivilized, distasteful, not quite *comme il faut*—in a word, 'uncool.' . . . In a world where democracy is synonymous less with freedom than with civilization itself, nobody can wait to be 'ready' for democracy."[14]

By the final years of the twentieth century, the measurements of democratic progress in the world had essentially reached their peaks. According to the Freedom House annual survey, the proportion of Free countries in the world had risen to 46 percent in 1998 (the 2013 figure stands at 45 percent), while the number of electoral democracies had reached 120 in 1999 (the figure for 2013 is 122, having risen from 118 in 2012). In sum, over the past fifteen years democracy has registered neither substantial gains nor substantial losses. Freedom House's finer-grained measurements of various aspects of political rights and civil liberties now show eight consecutive years of slight declines, but there still has not been anything like the kind of reverse wave that Huntington identified in earlier periods. It is true that since 1999 the frequency of democratic reversals has increased, but the breakdown or erosion of democracy has occurred mostly in countries where it had never sunk deep roots; moreover, some of these reversals were short-lived and were followed by movement back toward democracy. Still, there is no denying that the third wave clearly has lost momentum. Indeed, a strong case can be made that today the era of democratic transitions is over, and should now become the province of the historians.

What, then, can we conclude about the status of democracy in the world today and its prospects in the years ahead? Let us begin with considerations that argue against a new (or renewed) democratic wave. First, it is important to recognize that the current situation reflects the enormous gains of the era of democratic transitions. The fact that so many countries became democratic during that era reduced the ranks of future candidates, and those that remain are rarely the most promising cases. In a sense, the "low-hanging fruit" has already been picked.

The future of China—whether it is able to maintain high economic growth without democratizing—will probably prove to be the single most important determinant of the struggle between democracy and authoritarianism.

Second, we are in the midst of a period when the attractiveness of the world's leading democracies has been declining. A big part of this, of course, is the global economic crisis that began in 2008 and most severely afflicted Europe and North America. But also important is the growing perception that the political institutions of the EU countries and the United States are functioning poorly. Furthermore, the foreign policy of the Western powers today has come to be regarded by much of the world as hesitant and halfhearted, and Western rhetorical support for democracy around the world increasingly seems empty and disconnected from what is happening on the ground.

Third, the vigor, if not necessarily the power, of authoritarian states on the international scene seems to be growing. A number of the leading autocratic powers are more assertive in seeking to influence developments both in their own regions and in international fora. The most significant among these states are China, Russia, Iran, Venezuela, and Saudi Arabia. They are not united by a common ideology or even by common geopolitical interests—clearly, for example, Iran and Saudi Arabia are rivals rather than allies. Yet all five do share a common hostility to the advance of democracy in their own regions, as well as to international norms conducive to the strengthening of democracy and human rights.[15]

At the same time, these three factors are far from telling the whole story. Although the pool of candidates for democratization may have shrunk, such autocracies as do remain may nonetheless become more likely to move in a democratic direction as their economic development proceeds. Even if, following Tocqueville, we reject the facile argument that modernization by itself will lead to the victory of freedom, the evidence suggests that richer societies are better able than poorer ones to sustain democratic political institutions.

In addition, the current malaise of the advanced democracies and the apparent vigor of the leading autocratic states may well prove to be temporary, as the somewhat comparable situation in the 1970s proved

to be. It is worth noting that, except for China, the other four leading authoritarian powers all are petrostates whose domestic stability and international influence are very much bolstered by high oil prices. Only China has been able, thus far, to combine authoritarianism with a truly competitive and productive economy, and thus it is the only one that offers much appeal as a model for other countries that are poor in natural resources. Indeed, the future performance and direction of China—whether it is able to maintain high economic growth without democratizing—will probably prove to be the single most important determinant of the outcome of the struggle between democracy and authoritarianism.

We should not fail to recognize that such a struggle is under way; in fact, it is intensifying, as is underlined by recent events in Ukraine. The latter may even suggest the possible return of an era, reminiscent of the period between World War I and the beginning of the third wave, when interstate conflict becomes the prime generator of regime change. But unless this kind of rapid breakdown of world order should occur, I do not foresee large-scale regime change in either direction in the decade ahead. That is not to say, of course, that regime change will cease to be a recurring feature of political life—after all, no regime is immortal. There may well be new transitions to democracy, but there are also likely to be new reversals that will more or less balance them out. The magnitude of democratic change brought by the third wave—the era par excellence of democratic transitions—is unlikely to be matched in the future.

Democracy continues to benefit from its superior legitimacy and from the fact that it meets the demands of ordinary people for the dignity that comes from having their views and their voices count. As the Arab Spring uprisings demonstrated once again, even seemingly stable autocracies remain vulnerable to the democratic aspirations of their people. It is not easy for authoritarians to justify why it is that political leaders should not be chosen by the people in free and fair elections. Thus they either resort to faking free and fair elections or they must rely on some other ideological argument for restricting the people's choice. That is why the Chinese Communist Party, far from abandoning any pretense of adherence to Marxism-Leninism (as many observers had predicted it would), is instead resuscitating the legacy of Mao Zedong. Otherwise, how could it justify the rule of a single party and the denial of any role for citizens in choosing those who govern them?

Yet as the sad outcome of many of the recent Arab revolts also demonstrates, democracy suffers from being a difficult form of government to establish, to sustain, and to make function well. Because of these difficulties, it faces constant challenges in newly democratic countries. So even if there continue to be revolts against dictatorship, there are also likely to be failed transitions and cases of democratic backsliding. It is reasonable to expect that the coming years will see some countries crossing the line, in both directions, between weak democracy and weak authoritarianism.

Moreover, the long-established democracies are far from immune

from the challenge of getting their political institutions to function well. They will need to improve their performance if they want the rest of the world to emulate them. Perhaps the most fatal blow to the cause of democracy would be the breakdown of democracy in a country where it has been strong and stable. This is a reason to be especially concerned about the fate of democracy in southern Europe. It would be terrible indeed if a new era of transitions away from democracy were to begin with the very countries that launched the third wave.

NOTES

1. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 3–5.

2. Huntington, *Third Wave,* xiii.

3. Aristotle, *Politics,* bk. V, 1301a–1316b.

4. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America,* trans. Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), vol. 1, intro., 1–7.

5. Tocqueville, *Democracy in America,* vol. 2, pt. 1, ch. 15, 451.

6. Tocqueville, *Democracy in America,* vol. 2, pt. 4, ch. 8, 673–75.

7. Tocqueville, *Democracy in America,* vol. 2, pt. 4, ch. 8, 676.

8. Huntington, *Third Wave,* 13–26.

9. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).

10. Dankwart Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," *Comparative Politics* 2 (April 1970): 337–63.

11. Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, 4 vols. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). Quotes are from vol. 4, Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies,* 38, 6.

12. Thomas Carothers, "The End of the Transition Paradigm," *Journal of Democracy* 13 (January 2002): 5–21.

13. O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Tentative Conclusions,* 11.

14. Ghia Nodia, "How Different Are Postcommunist Transitions?" *Journal of Democracy* 7 (October 1996): 20.

15. The International Forum for Democratic Studies, under the leadership of executive director Christopher Walker, is hosting a series of roundtables on the authoritarian resurgence titled "The World Movement Against Democracy." It will yield a number of future *Journal of Democracy* essays and, eventually, an edited volume to be published by Johns Hopkins University Press. The book will consist of separate articles on each of the "Big Five" authoritarian powers, as well as a set of comparative essays looking at their influence in such arenas as international and regional organizations, Internet governance, restrictions on civil society, international election monitoring, and international broadcasting.